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The strategic position of the legal profession has especially intrigued social
scientists interested in the anatomy of the power structure in a society ordered
by law. Despite numerous studies generated by the Survey of the Legal Profession,' our knowledge of how the profession functions is inadequate. Is the
bar effectively organized to render service? In particular, are the lower and
middle income groups adequately served by lawyers? Are lawyers performing
professional services that can be handled more efficiently and economically
by lay agencies? Are lawyers in big law-shops able to maintain independence
essential to the profession, or have they become subservient to their clients?
What are the problems of the solo practitioner? How does he differ from his
colleagues in larger law firms ? What of legal ethics ? How do lawyers get their
business? The profession and the public can benefit from studies bearing on
these questions. We need the cold analytic approach of trained social scientists
applying modem methodology.
This book purports to be a sociological study of the practice of law by solo
practitioners. It is held out as a realistic picture to enable the public to "appraise more intelligently the functions of the profession upon which it must
depend for the preservation of its rights and liberties" and to enable the bar
2
"to take whatever actions are necessary to put its house in order."
The author, a law school graduate and a sociologist, is ideally trained for
the undertaking. One finishes the book with an, overriding impression that the
lawyer has gotten the better of the social scientist. The book is a well-written,
well-organized and highly interesting brief. Its earnest and fearless tone convinces me that the author is unaware of his own bias.
The book is based on information from some ninety-three interviews in
depth personally conducted by the author with Chicago lawyers practicing on
their own. Of the ninety-three lawyers interviewed, sixty-seven were in fulltime independent practice, six were young lawyers just getting started, eleven
had left the practice to go into business or to take a salaried position, and
nine, for all practical purposes, were never in private practice. We shall-come
back to the adequacy of the sample later.
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In the first chapter, "The Road to Individual Practice," the author concludes that the individual practitioner of law is a self-made man who came up
the hard way from poor immigrant surroundings. The father, generally an
immigrant from eastern Europe, with little or no formal education, was in
most cases a proprietor of a small business. Generally he receives his professional training in one of the proprietary or Catholic night law schools. He
works for another lawyer as a kind of apprentice for the first few years out of
law school, and after a year or two of sharing space, usually without salary,
he goes out on his own. Some of the hard experiences of several interviewees
in their apprenticeship, and the difficulties of their obtaining clients are set
forth at length. The author further concludes that individual practitioners
constitute something like a lower class of the metropolitan bar. Their practice is confined to those nonremunerative matters which the large firms have
not preempted, and "the undesirable cases, the dirty work, those areas of
practice [local tax, municipal, personal injury, divorce and criminal matters]
that have associated with them the aura of influencing and fixing and that involve arrangements with clients and others that are felt by the large firms to be
professionally damaging."3
The author describes the work of the solo practitioner in the second chapter, discussing eight areas of practice: Business-corporate, real estate, tax,
personal injury, divorce, will-probate-estate, criminal and collections. He
draws a distinction between his interviewees, dividing them into two groups,
lower-level lawyers and upper-level lawyers. This classification will be considered later.
What emerges from the analysis of each type of practice is that the lowerlevel practitioner engages in routine work, calling for little or no skill, mediates between the client and various institutions; relying heavily for his practice
on recommendations of clients, friends and relatives; a few referrals from
other lawyers; and only occasionally appears in court to try a case. In contrast, the upper-level practitioner exercises professional skills in a variety of
ways; acts as counsel for corporations and others in substantial matters;
spends more time in actual trial-work practice; and relies heavily on referrals
from other lawyers.
How the individual practitioner gets his business is the subject of Chapter
Three. The author concludes that it is difficult to build up a practice by relying
principally on family sources and friends. Lawyers turn to their own neighborhoods, engage in political activity to become better known and believe that
the way to get business is to be active in organizations. The potential clientele
of most individual practitioners, in spite of and in part because of their participation in organizations and politics, tends to be restricted to their social,
economic or ethnic stratum. Cut off from the large corporate client, the individual practitioner relies upon persons who are in positions to identify and
3 P. 18.
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channel potential legal business to the lawyer. These act as brokers between
lawyer and client. They include other lawyers, accountants, real estate or insurance brokers, doctors, policemen, bondsmen or precinct captains. Referrals from other lawyers constitute a major source of business for at least some
respondents in the upper-level category. This is particularly true with relation
to personal injury, tax, divorce and criminal matters.
Chapter Four describes the ethical dilemmas of individual practice, such as
solicitation, the problems of pay-offs and political influence and the fiduciary
problem. A large number of those in the sample, particularly during the early
years of practice, have assumed an aggressive attitude toward business-getting
in violation of the spirit and frequently the letter of the Canons of Ethics. Payoffs and political influence cause two principal problems. First, the author
says, "there is a tendency of a good many individual lawyers to compensate
for their apparent insecurity, sense of inadequacy and lack of confidence by
acting like bigshots, passing out large tips and presents in order to ensure their
being known by the clerks and other officials." 4 The second problem arises
from certain local statutes and ordinances that are often grossly unrealistic,
and practically unenforceable. Making payments to people in the State's
Attorney's Office, the Board of Zoning or Tax Appeals or the Board of
County Commissioners insures more favorable interpretation or treatment.
Finally, the fiduciary responsibility imposed by the Canons may be breached
because of an attitude either that clients are expendable or, on the other hand,
that they are to be treated as partners.
Chapter Five is headed "The Anatomy of Dissatisfaction." The author
states: "Finding himself on the lowest rung of the status ladder of the profession, with little or no chance of rising, his practice restricted to the least remunerative and least desirable matters-to the dirty work of the professionand beset by competition from lawyers and laymen alike, the individual practitioner is frequently a dissatisfied, disappointed, resentful, angry man." 5 He
claims that the major source of dissatisfaction is the inability to rise above the
lowest status level of the bar, and also that the low status of the individual
practitioner is most effectively brought home to him by his virtual exclusion
from positions of formal leadership in the bar. Although he places a high
value on being independent, he is "only too well aware of the illusory nature
of such a position." 6 -The author moves from the discussion of the interview material to some
general conclusions about the individual practitioner in Chicago. He questions whether much of the work done by the individual practitioner could not
be done more competently and efficiently in other ways. He claims that "because of the residual character of the practice, the individual lawyer generally
finds it difficult, if not in some instances impossible, to conform to the ethical
4 p. 160.
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standards of practice." 7 The solo practitioner is exposed to pressures to engage
in practices contrary to the official norms, and because he is more likely to get
the dirty work, is less likely to keep clean. Finally, the author concludes that
bar associations, in formally disciplining lawyers, have an "unhealthy element
of hypocrisy ....[P]unishment of wrongdoers under these circumstances
makes very little sense except as a symbolic gesture."s He claims that "the
real problem is one of altering the underlying conditions which force certain
practitioners into unethical practices" 9 and to do something about the corruption and inefficiency of the local courts and agencies, the unrealistic and unenforceable statutes. Carlin asserts that the part of the bar that "potentially has
the power to change these conditions-the large firm lawyers and the professional associations they control"1o are punishing the solo practitioner rather
than taking any effective steps toward reform. It is asserted that "What seems
to lie behind this unwillingness to take the necessary steps is not just an indifference to the problems of the individual practitioner (although this may
well be a part of the story) but a fear of going too far, of upsetting a delicately
contrived balance."" The argument is forcefully stated:
In some strange way it appears that the elite of the metropolitan bar has
made its gentlemen's agreement with the lower element of the bar in the
same way that it has made its peace with the local politicians-namely, by
agreeing not to interfere with one another, by a kind of ritual avoidance
and separation. As in all such agreements, however, one manages to keep
clean only at a price-in this case it is again hypocrisy. For, while stoutly
accusing their colleagues of unethical practices, the lawyers in the large
firms, refusing to handle the dirty work themselves, do not hesitate to refer
such matters to the individual practitioner, knowing full well what he must
do to handle it.12
These are far-reaching conclusions, and, if true, I agree with the author that
the organized bar and the public have great cause for concern and a responsibility to do something about it. But are the conclusions valid? It is tempting
to answer this question by drawing upon my own experience as a solo practitioner for many years. I have difficulty in recognizing myself or numerous
other individual practitioners with whom I have had professional and social
relationships over the years. For me, the years of solo practice were an exciting and rewarding professional experience. However, such an approach, I can
hear the author say, is highly unscientific.
If the author had been content to describe the experience of the small number of lawyers he interviewed, and to refrain from generalizing about all individual practitioners, there could be no criticism of his approach. Such a book
would have been on solid ground and would have been a constructive and
valuable contribution to our knowledge. But as is apparent, the author is not
P. 209.
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content with this modest approach. Instead he purports to describe the practice of approximately fifty-five per cent (or over 5,000) of all Chicago lawyers.
He purports to do so in a scientific and scholarly manner. The book fails because the author has stretched and distorted his materials. It is because of this
that he has done a disservice to his fellow researchers, to the public and to
the bar.
Let us begin with the author's methodology. Although there is reference to
numerous secondary sources, the bulk of his findings emanates from interviews with sixty-seven lawyers in full-time practice. Considering the variety
and complexity of private practice, it would appear on the surface that a
sample of sixty-seven full-time practitioners is hardly adequate to warrant an
evaluation of over half the lawyers in a large metropolitan city such as Chicago. Moreover, the conclusions he draws from this sample are invalidated by
the manner in which he has used his classification of lower-level and upperlevel lawyer. Of the sixty-seven lawyers, thirty-one are classified as lower-level
and thirty-six as upper-level. The criteria applied in making this classification
are not set forth systematically in the book. The chief criterion seems to be
overhead and income. For upper-level lawyers overhead costs are seventyfive per cent higher and income seventy per cent higher than for lower-level
lawyers. Other distinctions are that in contrast with the lower-level practitioner, the upper-level lawyer does not have a neighborhood office, draws far
less on neighborhood sources for business, does substantial real estate work,
represents fairly large corporate clients on a continuous basis, performs high
level technical skills, has less difficulty in getting business and is far less
troubled by competition of lay agencies.
In comparing these two groups of lawyers, the author presents a far more
positive picture of upper-level practitioners. They appear to be successful
financially, to function professionally in important matters, to be more ethical
than their unfortunate lower-level brethren and to be more content with their
lot.
When the author ventures into generalities about the individual practitioner, he overlooks the upper-level group of his interviewees, though they
represent more than half of his sample. All the negative factors that he has
ascribed to the lower-level practitioner are carried over to all individual practitioners, and the positive aspects of the practice of more than one-half of his
sample are rejected. For example, his conclusion that "most individual practitioners in the metropolitan bar are men of high ambition who haven't made
it"13 does not square with the author's description of the upper-level lawyer.14
The result is, of course, to present the most unfavorable picture of the solo
practitioner. It would have been equally possible for a researcher interested
in placing a favorable light on solo practitioners to generalize about them
from the viewpoint of the upper-level lawyers in the group.
13

P. 200. (Emphasis in original.)

14 pp. 44-51, 58-60, 78-82, 99, 114-15.
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At least, the author owed it to the reader to make clear what attributes of
the lower-level group he was ascribing to the solo practitioner and similarly,
how he used his findings with reference to the upper-level group. It would appear that most of the generalizations are based on his interviews with some
thirty-one lawyers-the lower-level practitioners, obviously a very flimsy sampie on which to predicate such overwhelming conclusions.
But this is not the only difficulty in the author's methodology. The prime
test of any sociological study of a professional group is the validity of the
sample.
The sample was of 100 lawyers under seventy years of age, first selected
from Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory for 1957 from among all the names
listed in the directory. Those not listed as individual practitioners or who
could not be located in the local Sullivan Law Directory or classified telephone directory were replaced by taking the individual listed in MartindaleHubbell immediately after the individual initially drawn. The method of
choosing the original 100 names from Martindalewas as follows: After a random start on the list, a name taken from the first page, every nth name was
chosen. The author does not state what the interval n was. Even if n was chosen
so that the sample would be drawn from the full list, A-Z, the sample would
not be, contrary to one's first impression, a simple random sample. To draw
a simple random sample, every possible combination of names must have an
equal probability of being drawn. The method chosen to select the sample,
however, confines the choice to only a few of all possible combinations. Further, the procedure followed in replacing names is open to question.
There is internal evidence that the sample was selected not from the A-Z
listings, but only from a segment of the list. In his initial selection of the 100
names the author found that seventy-seven were individual practitioners.
From the 1956 and 1958 Martindale directories, it appears that 57.9 per cent
and 53.3 per cent respectively of all listed lawyers in Chicago were individual
practitioners. Since a 1957 figure is not available, we may assume that the
average of the two figures or 55.6 per cent of the lawyers listed in the 1957
directory were individual practitioners. The great disparity between this average and the author's finding of seventy-seven per cent would indicate that the
sample was not drawn from the entire list in Martindale'sDirectorybut rather
from some unknown subsection.
The author notes that individual practitioners tend to be second-generation
immigrants and are frequently Jewish. Their names are apt to be clustered in
certain letters of the alphabet, and, hence, in Martindale'slist. The resulting
sample with sixty-eight per cent second generation and fifty-five per cent
Jewish, would indicate that the sample is clustered after the random start
among the surnames of Jewish or immigrant stock, making suspect all generalizations about ethnic, religious, educational or training factors.
Certainly generalizations such as the following are not warranted: "The
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rigidity of the class structure of the metropolitan bar is evidenced by the fact
that those who start out as individual practitioners rarely become associates
or partners in the larger firms. Moreover, most lawyers who are at present
individual practitioners entered the profession as such (or as employees of
such lawyers) and have remained at that level of practice."15 The first statement is presumptively based on evidence not presented in the text or accompanying tables. It could not in any case be inferred from a sample of individual practitioners since it requires knowledge of how lawyers who are now
partners in the larger firms started out. The second statement is apparently
based on the author's sample and is not warranted, if, as I have been led to
suspect, the sample is statistically unsound. The skimpy material from which
the author draws just will not support the bulk of his generalizations.
This brings me back to the question of bias. The author chose, for some
reason known only to himself, to present the practice of the individual practitioner in negative terms. One can say, as he has, that the solo practitioner
handles the dirty work of the bar. On the other hand, one can also say that the
solo practitioner carries the primary responsibility of the bar for the administration of justice. The solo practitioner represents almost all persons accused
of crime and therefore plays a significant role not only in preserving the rights
of the individuals involved, but in developing the law in this field. Similarly,
the great bulk of plaintiffs' work in the field of personal injury litigation is
carried by the solo practitioner. In doing this work, he is in turn playing a
vital role in the development of tort law. The same can be said for attorneys
who are specializing in the field of family law. Finally, and not without major
significance, it is upon the solo practitioner that the burden falls for handling
the unpopular cause.
Some of the author's conclusions are at variance with well-established and
easily ascertainable facts. The assertion that "the individual lawyer is only
rarely called upon to practice law in the traditional sense" 1 6 does not jibe with
the fact that many of our leading trial lawyers are individual practitioners and
that in most cases taken to reviewing courts, one or both parties are represented by individual practitioners. Trial and appellate work are recognized as
most demanding of a lawyer's skills.
The author's bias is not limited to the individual practitioner but extends to
the legal profession as a whole. My conclusion is not based on the author's
sharp criticism of the organized bar. Many of us have been as critical about
our failure to take leadership in numerous problem areas. The bias is apparent
first from the manner in which the author has used his limited materials. His
decision to generalize from part of his sample is the best evidence of his attitude. But in addition there are curious asides that give him away. For example,
although the study was only of individual practitioners, and the sample
Is P. 18.
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limited to this group, the author refers to the small and middle-sized law
offices and states: "While it is difficult to distinguish the majority of these
lawyers from individual practitioners in terms of social background, training
and type of practice, it is likely that the middle-sized firms, at any rate, may
constitute something like a middle class of the metropolitan bar." 17 The only
authority cited for this statement is a footnote that refers to a classification
made by the author of random samples of type of law school attended; the
number in the sample and method of selection is not discussed. This footnote
may justify the author's statement as to training, assuming the validity of his
statistical test, but there is no support for his statement that equates the social
background and type of practice with that of the individual practitioner. The
reader is left to conclude that the unfavorable picture drawn of the individual
practitioners, as to these factors, applies to lawyers in small and middle-size
firms. This leaves only the larger firms. They remain relatively unsullied until
the conclusion when it appears that they are guilty of "unhealthy hypocrisy"
and that they prefer to punish rather than to use their power to achieve reforms.
Placing to one side the gross misuse of the material that came out of the
interviews, the author has produced information of value and importance.
Although the lawyers interviewed are not a fair sample of the individual bar,
they represent a group, perhaps a sizable group of practicing lawyers. The
problems reflected by their experiences cannot be ignored. Unfortunately,
this book will not advance the day of serious consideration and action.
ALEX ELSON*
17pp. 18-19.
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Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act. By FREDERICK M.
RowE. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1962. Pp. xxx, 675. $22.50.
The watched pot sometimes does come to a boil, and Mr. Rowe's occasional essays, simmering in the law reviews these last ten years, plus his substantial
contribution to the longest, the best, and the most reviled chapter of the
Report of the Attorney-General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws' are blended here into an antitrust classic. Little has been missed, and
every issue touched is clarified. One can profitably pick it up for a case, a discussion, a list of citations and comments, but even the busiest practicing
lawyer is best advised to read it through. Those to whom the book's always
vigorously stated opinions are least congenial will benefit from it most. Mr.
Rowe insists that for effective counseling and advocacy one needs to know the
1 Antitrust Policy in Distribution,AT-Y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 129-221
(1955).

